INTRODUCTION
Recent FTAS have adopted dispute settlement systems quite independent of each other's system, and different to the WTO system. The obvious question is as to why this is so, or for that matter why FTAs have not adopted an acceptable common system for use by all parties to FTAs while still remaining outside the WTO system. The explanation for this mainly lies in the special characteristics of FTAs. A core characteristic of FTA is that it offers WTO-plus liberalisation, i.e. it provides access to investment, competition, and labour markets beyond that offered under the WTo agreements. Consequently, parties to a FTA cannot access the WTo dispute settlement process on a WTo-plus dispute matter. Given the increase in the number of FTAs, the issue of how best disputes under these agreements can be resolved arises. Threshold considerations on this matter include both the method, and means of dispute resolution. With respect to the former, the choices between litigation (adjudication by a system of courts of law), or by resort to alternative dispute resolution mechanisms (ADR) such as mediation, conciliation, and arbitration, or any combination of litigation and ADR arise. And with respect to means, choices include national court systems, members of professional ADR bodies such as arbitrators, as well as a system of especially constituted international courts such as the Tribunal and Appellate Body established under the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (Dsu), or a combination thereof.
This article focuses on what would be an appropriate framework for dispute settlement to be adopted in the forthcoming Australia-China free trade agreement (ACFTA) currently being negotiated. It proceeds in five parts. Part ii examines the role of ADR and litigation under the WTo dispute settlement system to see how far these approaches have influenced dispute settlement under the presently existing FTAs. Part III investigates why existing FTAs have not adopted the WTo dispute settlement model, but have instead adopted a variety of alternative approaches of their own, including the multiple dispute procedures under the North American FTA (NAFTA), quasi-judicial approach under EU-Chile FTA, and ad-hoc arbitral tribunal under Singapore-Australia FTA and New Zealand-China FTA. To usefully employ the experience of these earlier models to ACTFA, Part Iv looks at the kind of trading disputes that Australia and China have encountered under the WTO, and how they were resolved, i.e. whether by invoking the formal WTO procedure, or by ADR methods such as consultation and arbitration. On the latter, evidence shows that a large proportion of disputes which Australia or China had been parties to were settled by "mutually agreed solution", i.e. by consultation or mediation. Part v explains why ADR is preferred over litigation in resolving disputes arising under ACFTA. Based on the view of maximising the use of consultation and mediation preceding arbitration, a dual dispute settlement mechanism with a general dispute settlement procedure for common-subject disputes such as antidumping, and a special procedure for WTO-plus matter disputes, such as investment, would appear to be the most appropriate under the proposed ACFTA. Part vi concludes.
DISPUTE RESOLUTION UNDER THE WTo AGREEMENTS
A fundamental question that arises in constructing and evaluating dispute settlement system at the international level is whether the system should be primarily designed to mediate disputes or to adjudicate them. Techniques used in respect of ADR methods include consultation, the use of good offices, mediation and conciliation, and arbitration. The adjudicative mechanism commonly refers to litigation. While both techniques are in use in all jurisdictions, the extent of the use of each of them varies as between jurisdictions.' Dispute settlement under GATT 1947 began with quasivoluntary procedures. It expressed a clear preference for negotiated settlements, originally even referring to the dispute settlement process as "conciliation", and requiring Contracting Parties to enter into consultation and negotiation. 2 Since then the WTo system has moved to incorporate elements of both ADR and litigation. The creation of the Dispute Settlement Body as well as the Appellate Body has driven the WTo system more towards litigation as a last resort as elaborated below.
ADR UNDER THE WTO

CONSULTATION AND MEDIATION
Under the WTo system, disputes start with mandatory consultation within a 60-day period. 3 The Dsu has no rules on the consultation process beyond requiring that I For example, while Germany favours litigation over ADR, China and Japan give more or equal status to the two. 3 According to Dsu Art 4, the parties must attempt to resolve their differences through consultations trying to reach a "mutually agreed solution". they be entered into in good faith within 30 days of a request. The hope is that the parties will resolve their dispute without resort to the dispute settlement procedures. In addition to consultation, the WTo also provides the option of good offices, conciliation and mediation to the disputant parties to help with the process. 4 These can be requested at any time by any party to a dispute. Moreover, the WTO The parties to a dispute in the WTo are represented by lawyers in both Panel and Appellate Body review process, which also include a litigation process for the Panellists and members of Appellate Body to assess the dispute. Similar to the litigation procedure, both parties are required to submit written documents, conduct oral argument, as well as present evidence. According to Dsu Art 11, the task of Panels is to make an objective assessment of the matter before them, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and their applicability and conformity with the relevant WTo agreements. The Appellate Body members are entitled to determine appeals on legal questions emanating from the Panel decision. Although the Appellate Body has shown respect for due process and the procedural rights of Members in the dispute settlement process, it has also recognised considerable discretion on the part of Panels and rejected most procedural process challenges.' 3 On the whole, it is difficult to characterise the Appellate Body as being more or less deferential to WTO member discretion than Panels. While it has significantly cut back on the scope of Panel rulings in some cases, it has also significantly expanded the scope of liability in others. In summary, the WTo dispute settlement system has incorporated the best of the attributes of both ADR and litigation. It has now evolved from an initial reliance primarily on diplomatic efforts to help parties work out their differences in a mutually agreeable fashion, towards greater institutional discipline and control over the settlement of disputes. This change enriches it with more judicial attributes in handling the disputes between its members, with the assistance of ADR methods. While its dispute settlement system has been praised by many, it has also been criticised for being costly, taking too long, lacking a roster of panellists, and its enforcement and implementation as ineffective.' 9 These comments have been taken into account by the FTAs as seen below.
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDER ExisTING FTAS
Compared to the WTO experience, the FTA dispute settlement procedure seems to be used much less frequently, and thus its record on disputes settlement is therefore limited. The two systems that have seen some use are those of NAFTA 
NAFTA
NAFTA, which includes Canada, Mexico, and the United States was signed on December 17, 1992.22 Its special feature is that instead of using one uniform procedure, it creates multiple dispute settlement mechanisms to deal with disputes on different subject matters. It includes Chapter 11 dealing with investor-state disputes especially, Chapter 19 for appealing the results of antidumping and countervailing duty decisions, and Chapter 20 providing general dispute settlement procedures and institutional arrangements. Although this has proved controversial, it demonstrates the capacity of an FTA to foster experimentation beyond the level possible in the multilateral system. This recourse to variety has proved instructive subsequent FTAS.
CHAPTER 11
Chapter 11 was designed to deal with the particularities of the politics of foreign investment in North America, targeting on encouraging cross-border investment. 23 The innovation about it is that it establishes a mechanism for the settlement of investment disputes through arbitration for private parties that were unprecedented in scope and power. When investors from one NAFTA country believe they had been treated unfairly by one of the other two signatory governments, they are not limited to seeking redress in the courts of that country. Rather, they are given the right to bring a claim for compensation against that government in an international tribunal, whose awards are enforceable in domestic courts. Such an approach assures both equal treatment among investors of the Parties of NAFTA in accordance with the principle of international reciprocity and due process before an impartial tribunal. the investors. 26 This approach gives unprecedented rights to private investors to take a complaint against a government directly to binding international arbitration, and has proved controversial in that it raises community fears and anger about the consequences of these new forms of rights. 27 Nevertheless, it has had significant impact on later FTAS.
CHAPTER 19
Chapter 19 of the NAFTA is also creative, because it governs anti-dumping and countervailing duty determinations exclusively. It is considered as somewhat of an anomaly in international dispute settlement since it applies importing party's domestic law rather than international law. To do so, an involved party may request a special 'Panel' to review a final antidumping or countervailing duty determination on whether such determination was in accordance with the antidumping or countervailing duty law of the importing Party. 28 Unlike the Panel of the WTO, however, it replaces judicial review of final antidumping and countervailing duty determinations with a bi-national Panel review, to re-examine the application of the country's domestic law. 29 The binational Panel process is quite novel in the sense that it is directed to complaints alleging a failure to correctly apply national antidumping and countervailing duty law. 27 Critics claim that it has not been used, as intended, to protect property rights against government measures 'tantamount to expropriation" but has legalized a peculiar American conception of property rights, given foreign corporations rights not available to nationals, and even been used to attack a wide array of national government regulation aimed at the social, environmental and other public goods. For example as commented by Professor Abbott, while dispute settlement system of Chapter 11 went as far as establishing a legal framework which provides attractive financial guarantees to the investors, it has not built a framework strong enough to accommodate social policies. See, John J. Kirton 
CHAPTER 20
Chapter 20 deals with general disputes arising among the member countries. It provides the legal basis for NAFTA's dispute resolution on interpretation and application, and aims to resolve disputes by agreement wherever possible. 33 This process has been characterised as "traditional state-to-state ad hoc arbitration." 34 It begins with government-to-government consultations, which can then proceed to a meeting of the ministerial level "Commission", and finally to the creation of an arbitral panel. 35 Moreover, it provides for the establishment of a roster of up to 30 individuals from which the arbitration panellists are normally to be drawn. 36 The Panel is to consist of five members, based on its rule requirements for qualification of Panellist as well as its procedures for Panel selection. 37 Such a list of panellists effectively avoids the waiting time problem for which the WTO process has been criticised. According to the NAFTA Secretariat, Chapter 20 has been used less frequently than Chapter 19, with most of the disputes resolved through consultation. To date only three cases have been settled through an arbitration panel, namely, the US complaints against Canada's application of higher tariff on agricultural products (1995), and Mexico's complaints against the US over brooms and cross-border trucking services (1997/1998).38
EU FTAs
EU bilateral agreements used to be based, almost exclusively, on traditional diplomatic means for dispute resolution. 39 As a result of dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of the diplomatic model as an instrument to solve trade disputes, experience with WTo dispute settlement and the demands of EU's trading partners, a quasi-judicial procedure for dispute settlements was introduced. This is signalled by the EC-Mexico FTA (2000) and the EU-Chile FTA (2003). The latter embodies a separate section of the detailed rules on dispute settlement 40 and represents a radical departure from prior EU practice of resolution through political and diplomatie channels.
The quasi-judicial approach of the EU-Chile FTA e.g. stipulates the use of arbitration as the main source of dispute settlement. China so far is a party to seven FTAs, the earliest having been signed in November 2004 and the latest in April 2010.54 The dispute settlement systems in these FTAs share a great similarity. The disputing parties are always encouraged to make every attempt to arrive at a mutually satisfactory resolution through negotiation, mediation or consultation amicably. If that fails to settle the dispute, the complaining party is allowed to make a written request for the establishment of an arbitration tribunal or panel. Three arbitrators are required in all the agreements. Compensation and suspension of benefits are available for the compliance and implementation purpose. More importantly, five of these seven FTAs include a special dispute settlement procedure for investor-state matters, 55 where the dispute is to be submitted to the international conciliation or arbitration fora for solution. The rules of ICSID and UNCITRAL are the most popular ones selected. A typical example of the operation of the dispute settlement mechanism China participated in is the New Zealand-China FTA signed on 7 April 2008 in Beijing, after negotiations spanning fifteen rounds over three years. 56 Its dispute settlement mechanism has a general dispute procedure as well as a special one exclusively on investment. The former starts with consultations and mediation, and ends up with the arbitral tribunal. Moreover, it also establishes a special procedure for investor and host state disputes. As with Singapore-Australia FTA, the disputing parties under this agreement too have the choices of conciliation or arbitration by ICSID, or arbitration under the rules of the UNCITRAL. on investment and anti-dumping and countervailing, most of them have a general procedure for resolution of disputes arising under the agreement, such as the quasijudicial approach in the EU-Chile FTA, and the ad-hoc arbitral tribunal under Singapore-Australia FTA and New Zealand-China FTA. An arbitration panel is required to be established when the consultations fail to settle a dispute within a certain period (normally 60 days), which normally consists of three arbitrators selected from an arbitrator list. Secondly, a special dispute settlement procedure for some specific subject is also included, e.g. financial services in EU-Chile FTA, and investor-state dispute in Singapore-Australia FTA. Such disputes are typically handled by special rules, e.g. the rules under ICSID, and UNCITRAL. These approaches no doubt provide great references for the formation of the dispute settlement mechanisms for the future FTAS. Moreover, unlike the WTo where arbitration applies only in limited circumstances, the above examination shows the broad use of ADR for dispute resolution between FTA members. Instead of going through litigation, "arbitral tribunal" is the most popular option for dispute settlement under FTAS.
PAST AND FUTURE DISPUTES
The dispute settlement systems of the WTo and the existing FTAs discussed above provide helpful references for ACFTA. As compared to the WTO, the latter provides illustrations of alternative approaches and procedures to be employed in claims between FTA members, such as e.g. multiple dispute procedure, quasi-judicial approach and ad-hoc arbitral tribunal. In order to design a dispute resolution model for ACFTA, however, it is necessary first to look at the kind of trading disputes that Australia and China have had in the past, as well as the possible disputes in the future. More importantly, it is necessary to examine how past WTo disputes to which Australia or China were parties had been resolved, i.e. whether by going through the formal WTO procedure, or by ADR methods such as consultation and arbitration, and what lessons they offer.
PAST DISPUTES
While Australia has been the complainant in 7, and respondent in 10 WTo cases, to none of these disputes was China a party. The subject matter of these disputes have been mainly in relation to sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPs), 58 involved in -all as respondent. The concern of these cases has been mostly about import requirements imposed by Australia on fresh fruit and vegetable as being more trade restrictive than necessary to protect Australian produce. This largely reflects the restrictive quarantine regime in Australia. A detailed research on the disputes Australia has been a party to show that of 11 cases finalised as at present, 5 were resolved through a "mutually agreed solution", 64 normally reached through negotiation and consultation.
The disputes thus settled or terminated upon the disputing parties notifying the Dispute Settlement Body that they had reached a mutually satisfactory agreement on the matter to the disputes. In summary, while the areas of dispute encountered by Australia and China over trade have been somewhat similar, they have different emphases. The former is more involved in Sps and anti-dumping, and the latter is more in anti-dumping. Obviously, how best to address the areas of conflict between the two countries in these areas is of high importance in shaping the dispute resolution model of the ACFTA. More importantly, the large proportion of dispute settlement by a 'mutually agreed solution' shows both countries' preferences of consultation and mediation. This provides a valuable reference guide in the search for an effective dispute settlement mechanism under ACFTA.
LIKELY AREAS OF FUTURE DISPUTES
Past disputes on Sps show Australia's adoption of a tough quarantine regime. This heralds a high possibility of SPs-related disputes under ACFTA. For example, even prior to ACFTA negotiations, Australia had expressed concerns over China's poor record on environmental and food safety standards. In their eleventh negotiation, Australia reiterated its position that it did not wish to negotiate its present approach to import risk analyses, quarantine standards, or systems for assessing food safety risks in its FTA, 75 meaning that the Sps standard that Australia will seek to enforce will be as strict as before for China to comply with. In addition, while China has been active in filing antidumping claims against the US and the EU on their measures on Chinese products, for example, coated free sheet paper and certain footwear,7' evidence shows the emerging anti-dumping activity in Australia against the cheap Chinese imports. For example, a "Don't Dump on Australia" campaign was launched by the Australian Workers Union recently, against imports, particularly from China, which were claimed to "cheat" on world trade rules. 7 7 These no doubt make antidumping a most likely subject of future dispute between the two countries.
The proposed ACFTA has been in the offing since 2005 and survived a change of government in Australia. 78 Two of the most sensitive issues in the ACFTA negotiation have been investment and services. In the words of Australia's then Trade Minister Simon Crean, "Access to direct investments in China had become a bigger priority for Australia as it negotiates an FTA." 7 9 Moreover, Canberra is also interested in acquiring market access in services for Australian firms. China for its part has reiterated its interest in Australia's foreign investment screening, particularly as the infrastructure access regime relates to minerals and energy. 80 Obviously, the disputes in the areas of investment and services will most likely be on top of the dispute list between the two countries. One key area of contention will be whether investor entities (companies) should be allowed to resort to the dispute settlement process against the host or investee State in their own right, and without reference to their home State as required under the WTO Agreements. The resolution of this is of course of significant concern and is considered in the discussion following.
PROPOSED DISPUTE RESOLUTION FRAMEWORK FOR ACFTA
As seen above, the design of an appropriate dispute settlement mechanism in respect of FTAs has proved to be a long drawn and difficult task. Factors taken into consideration include the effective use of diplomatic and judicial channels, and rules relating to jurisdiction and enforcement. Moreover, it also requires the delicate balancing of legal and procedural certainty and the exercise of discretion. As observed by one commentator: "On the one hand, they care about compliance with the agreement, the value of which depends on the extent to which other parties honour their commitments. The more legalistic the dispute settlement mechanism they design, the higher the likely level of compliance. On the other hand, they also care about their own policy discretion -and the less legalistic the mechanism, the greater their discretion to craft policies that solidify domestic support." 8 1
Special factors relating to ACTFA include the following. First, by reason of the differences in their economic, social, and legal outlook, the two countries operate totally different judicial systems; secondly, is the information to be gathered from the subject matter and type of disputes the two countries as members of the WTo have encountered with other members of the WTo, and the way they have been resolved; thirdly, is the balance of litigation and ADR struck by the two countries for use in relation to the resolution of disputes within their own territorial jurisdictions; and finally the political sensitivities of the trading relationship between the two countries and their nationals.
In respect of the first, while China is a communitarian society, Australia is a liberal democracy; while Australia is a well established free market economy, China is still in the process of being transformed into a market economy; and while China is dependent on bank based finance (both private and State) for its capital needs, Australia is largely dependent on stock exchange based capital for its requirements. Moreover, while the Australian legal system and legal traditions are based on the common law, and legal proceedings adversarial, China's legal system is civil law based, legal traditions Confucian, with legislation as the primary source of law, and has an inquisitorial court system.
In respect of the second, the areas of dispute the two countries have encountered with other member countries of the WTo have been in respect of Australia SPs and antidumping, and in respect of China antidumping, subsidies and countervailing measures, and intellectual property rights. These are common-subject disputes covered by both WTo and FTAs. In respect of the FTA between China and Australia, the likely areas of dispute will be of a WTo-plus nature, as it covers special matter dispute such as investment. Thus how to handle these two kinds of disputes is the top priority of the dispute settlement mechanism under ACFTA. Questions arising in this connection include whether disputes be resolved through litigation or arbitration, and the role of arbitration and ADR in such a system, and whether investor entities should have access to dispute settlement process in their own right Thirdly, on the balance of litigation and ADR, China has a long history of mediation and conciliation based in part on Confucian principles of comity and accord with others in commercial transactions and personal relationships.
2 Given the continued Influence of Confucian culture on politics, business, and cultural transactions in modem China, and the advantages of arbitration perceived by many parties involved in international business around the globe, arbitration has become a frequently selected and more viable dispute resolution option in China in recent decades. Convention and the Model Law of United Nations Committee on International Trade Law. Australia too, while predominantly reliant on litigation, is increasingly progressing in its use of ADR practices for dispute settlement. According to the survey conducted by Australia's National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council into the use of ADR in the civil justice system, ADR has expanded into a large, highly diverse and innovative field. 5 More recent news showed that Victoria has introduced pre-litigation requirements requiring parties to participate in ADR prior to the commencement of proceedings which relate to a "civil dispute", and it is anticipated that in mid 2011 the Civil Procedure Act Nsw will be amended to follow up. 86 Although Australia's international arbitration structure and ADR processes were lagging behind others in the region and in Europe, it is viewed as having efficient and effective procedures and practices, with an open court system and arbitration friendly environment. 8 ' The recent amendment of the International Arbitration Act 1974 of Australia represents Australia's broader push to promote more effective resolution of commercial disputes through arbitration. In introducing the amending Bill, the Attorney-General highlighted its aim was to "emphasise the importance of speed, fairness and cost-effectiveness in international arbitration, while clearly defining and limiting the role of the courts in international arbitration without compromising the important protective function they exercise."" Based on the developed arbitration regulations and practices in both Australia and China, arbitration is a better choice to be recommended for the ACFTA.
Finally, the recent Stern Hu case highlights the political sensitivities in the trading relationship between the two countries. The case involved a Chinese national who had become a naturalised Australian citizen. He later worked for an Australian company which appointed him as their resident representative in China. He was accused of industrial espionage by the Chinese government and imprisoned pending the hearing of his case in 2009.89 Quite a number of comments were made in the Australian Press following his detention in China. Most of these comments were directed at China's legal system, which was criticised for lack of transparency in the conducting of the case, unfair legal procedures, lack of rule of law, manipulation of judicial procedures for political purpose, etc. 9 0 Stephen Smith, the then Australian Foreign Affairs Minister, described the sentences to Stern Hu as 'harsh' and the then Australian Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, criticised China's lack of transparency in handling the case. 91 Given the close relations between politics, business and the law all over the world, Australia may have arrived at a similar decision had it been in China's position.
All of the above factors serve to highlight difficulties in the use of litigation as the medium of dispute settlement for commercial matters arising under the proposed ACFTA. In this context it is necessary to look at what form of dispute resolution mechanism will serve best the interests of both Australia and China. Given the likely areas of disputes between the two countries, namely, common-subject dispute and WTo-plus matter disputes such as investor entity rights to dispute resolution, and a dual dispute settlement mechanism is proposed for ACFTA with the following detailed operational procedures.
A GENERAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURE FOR COMMON-SUBJECT DISPUTE
The experience of the FTAs that Australia and China are already a party to, suggests that a general dispute settlement procedure for common-subject disputes through an arbitration tribunal is preferred and mostly accepted and practiced, as illustrated by e.g. the Singapore-Australia FTA, and the New Zealand-China FTA referred to above. The general procedure should provide first, that the dispute be resolved by ADR means. This is because the past disputes that Australia and China have been a party to show high frequency of their being settled by a "mutually agreed solution". Thus, ACFTA should take heed of this experience and emphasise the use of consultation, conciliation, and mediation to resolve the problems. Secondly, due to the highly frequent involvement of SPS and anti-dumping disputes of Australia and China, a special government agency is needed to monitor these two specific sectors. Such agency should be established in the two countries respectively, aiming to address the possible emerging problems relating to Sps and anti-dumping at an early stage. Thirdly, a general procedure should provide the procedure for the establishment of an Arbitral Tribunal when ADR fails to settle a dispute within a certain period. Additionally, a roster of up to ten individuals as potential panellist for a three-arbitrator panel should be included to save the waiting time of creating arbitration panels and help speed up the arbitration process. 92 Fourthly and more importantly, as common-subject disputes are covered by both WTo and FTA, it is important that the jurisdiction of such disputes be explicitly addressed when drafting FTAs to avoid problems of overlap of dispute settlement procedures between the WTO and ACFTA as well as the problem of double dipping. For example, if China was to file a case on Sps against Australia, should it be brought to ACFTA or WTO, or should China be allowed to claim first under ACFTA, and a second time before the WTO? Generally, "choice of forum" under FTA is regulated in three ways:
93 (1) Oblige the complainant to submit the dispute to the WTO; 9 4 (2) Oblige the complainant to submit the dispute under the FTA; 9 s or (3) Leave the choice of forum up to the complainant. Obviously, the exclusive jurisdiction clauses in the first two methods are the best means to avoid the complex overlaps between the WTo and FTA.
Closer examination of the existing FTAs which Australia and China are separately parties to suggests the complaining party is free to select the forum in which to settle the dispute. 96 In addition, to prevent a jurisdictional battle that may prolong the legal process, ACETA should also include "forum exclusion clauses" to clarify the jurisdiction of common-subject disputes. Such clauses are desirable in the sense that they limit the scope of conflicting rulings. 9 7 Most FTAs have therefore included a provision stating that once dispute settlement procedures have been initiated in one forum, it shall be to the exclusion of the other. 
A SPECIAL DisPuT SETTLEMENT PROCEDURE FOR WTO-PLUS MATTER DISPUTE
A special dispute settlement procedure is needed where disputes on WTo-plus matters arise, and WTO cannot provide any solutions. In ACFTA's case, the WTO-plus matter is mainly about investor-state dispute. The inclusion of investor-state dispute resolution system in an agreement is essential to protect the investors from actions by governments in changing the rules after an investment decision has been made. While it provides attractive financial guarantees to the investors, it also raises controversial questions. For example, whether Australian investors be favoured over the focal Chinese entities and vice versa, and whether Chinese investor companies be given the right to ignore Australia's local courts and resort to Arbitration of their own accord and vice versa. As noted by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia, some investor-state dispute settlement provisions grant new procedural rights to foreign investors that are not afforded to domestic investors, who are unable to seek third-party arbitration against the Australian Government. 99 Against this is the need to attract and retain foreign direct investment in each of these countries. For example, if Australian investments into China face greater political risk in the absence of a treaty than do Chinese domestic investors, then no doubt the levels of investment into China from Australia will be very much limited. Thus, in order to encourage the investment flows under FTAS, it is crucial that the investor-state Dsm is carefully designed to balance the interests of different parties. A case by case approach to the inclusion of investor-state dispute settlement provision in Australia's international agreements has been recently proposed by Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, based on the consideration of the state of the legal system in the partner country, and the promotion of bilateral investment flows etc. 100 In the Australia-China context, the Stern Hu case discussed above has shown Australia's dissatisfaction regarding China's legal system, and this no doubt acts as a positive drive for the inclusion of an investor-state provision in ACFTA to settle all the disputes through international rules rather than domestic ones. The case also highlighted the ability of multinationals to lobby the government to act on their behalf Moreover, the investment sector has played a considerable role in both countries in initiating this agreement. To have a separate procedure for investmentrelated disputes which would facilitate and promote investment flows would obviously be in the common interest of both parties.
As Mexico's experience with its disputes with the US on sugar shows, for WToplus obligations to be functional, it is crucially important to have a workable FTA procedure. 101 In its absence, WTo-plus elements cannot be enforced. Two steps are recommended for the special dispute settlement procedure under ACFTA. Firstly, as with the general procedure, the role of consultation and negotiation should be emphasised before proceeding to arbitration. As specified by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, methods of ADR that seek to resolve disputes through negotiation or amicable settlement is a very important alternative to international investment arbitration and thus should be promoted.1 02 Secondly, is the conducting of arbitration through third parties under clearly articulated rules and procedures. The setting of arbitration procedures exclusively for investment-state disputes in ACFTA requires them to be sufficiently detailed so as to prevent or reduce the adverse effect of investment arbitration, such as arbitrator bias and lack of transparency and public scrutiny. The Australia-Chile FTA is a useful example in this sense. It contains considerably more detailed procedural requirements than for Australia's other agreements, such as the requirement that investors attempt to consult with the host 
CONCLUSION
The core feature of FTAS offering WTo-plus liberalisation shows that not all disputes between FTA members can be resolved under the WTo dispute settlement system. A separate dispute settlement mechanism beyond WTO is necessary to sustain the WTO-plus benefits in FTAs. Given that the number of parties to each of the FTAS is small, their concerns regional, and their interests specific, the approaches FTA members have adopted for dispute settlement vary from each other. The assessment of past disputes in which Australia and China have been involved in, and the likely areas of disputes in the future suggest two kinds of disputes that ACFTA will have to deal with: common subject disputes such as anti-dumping, and WTO-plus matter disputes on 103 Productivity Commission Report, supra n. 52, 317. 104 
